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PLC FORENSICS BASED ON CONTROL
PROGRAM LOGIC CHANGE DETECTION
WORKS
Ken Yau and Kam-Pui Chow
University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China
kenyaufriends@yahoo.com.hk, chow@cs.hku.hk
ABSTRACT
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system is an industrial control automated
system. It is built with multiple Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs). PLC is a special form of
microprocessor-based controller with proprietary operating system. Due to the unique architecture
of PLC, traditional digital forensic tools are difficult to be applied. In this paper, we propose a
program called Control Program Logic Change Detector (CPLCD), which works with a set of
Detection Rules (DRs) to detect and record undesired incidents on interfering normal operations
of PLC. In order to prove the feasibility of our solution, we set up two experiments for detecting
two common PLC attacks. Moreover, we illustrate how CPLCD and network analyzer Wireshark
could work together for performing digital forensic investigation on PLC.
Keywords: PLC Forensics, SCADA Security, Ladder Logic Programming
INTRODUCTION
Digital forensics plays an important role for
incident investigations on digital devices, for
example, personal computer, smart-phone,
digital camera, and flash drive.  Standard
guidelines and procedures are provided to
implement the digital forensic processes:
identification, collection, analysis and reporting
[11]. According to the collected evidence,
investigators can re-construct the incident and
present to a court if crime is involved.  In
addition, the evidence can be used to trace
what causes the incidents in order to avoid the
same incident happening again in the future
[2].
A programmable logic controller (PLC) is a
special form of microprocessor-based controller.
It uses a programmable memory to store
instructions and to implement functions such
as logic, sequencing, timing, counting and
arithmetic in order to control machines and
processes [1]. Lighting Control system is one
example of PLC applications. It is used to turn
lights on automatically when the area becomes
occupied and off when it becomes unoccupied.
A simple automation control system can be
monitored and controlled by a single PLC.
However, a complex and larger automation
control system called Supervisory Control and
Data Acquisition (SCADA) system, needs to
be built with multiple PLCs. SCADA system is
an automation system widely used to monitor
and control industrial processes such as electric
power generation, public transportation,
chemical plants, water management and so on.
If any undesired incidents occur on the
SCADA systems, substantial risk to the health
and safety of human lives, serious damage to
the environment, as well as serious financial
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issues such as production losses, negative
impact to a nation’s economy, and compromise
of proprietary information [2].
SCADA systems are always built with
proprietary technologies and communication
protocols. For example, PLC manufacturers
provide its proprietary operating systems to
their products. Due to the uniqueness of
SCADA system, there are several challenges
when performing digital forensic processes on
these systems. Those challenges will be
discussed in Section 4. In this paper, we
propose a solution to detect and record
abnormal operations of PLC based on the
control program logic change in PLC. The
abnormal operations are stored in the format
of a log file which could help SCADA forensic
investigation.
SECURITY ISSUES OF
PLC
An automation control system can be setup by
connecting a PLC with Input and Output
devices. Input devices might be switches,
temperature sensors, flow sensors, etc. Output
devices might be motors, solenoid valves, etc.
Besides hardware installation, the PLC has to
be programmed in order to monitor the inputs
and control the outputs based on a set of
control rules. Each PLC manufacturer has its
own software for programming their PLCs. For
example, PLCs of Siemens Simatic S7 series
are programmed, configured, and managed
using software STEP 7.
Nowadays, many PLCs have evolved to
utilize common networking standard such as
Ethernet (IEEE 802.3) and Wi-Fi (IEEE
802.11) for communication among the
connected devices [3]. Therefore, cyber-attacks
on SCADA systems become one of the
important security issues after the systems
have been exposed to the Internet.
ATTACKS ON PLCS
There are various kinds of attacks on PLCs.
One of the famous attacks is STUXNET, a
malware to infect Simatic programming device
(i.e., PC running Step 7 on Windows). The
malware was used to reprogram the PLCs by
inserting its own blocks of code, and replacing
or infecting existing blocks [6]. According to
the paper “Exploiting Siemens Simatic S7
PLCs” [3], Dillon Beresford mentioned that the
network protocols designed for communication
among field devices in control systems were
intended to be open and reliable, but not
secure in past. International Standards
Organization Transport Service Access Point
(ISO-TSAP RFC 1006) is one of the not secure
network protocols.
Dillon Beresford demonstrated several
attacks on Siemens Simatic S7 PLCs during
the presentation at Black Hat 2011 Conference.
The attacks were 1) TCP Replay over ISO-
TSAP Attack; 2) S7 Authentication Bypass; 3)
CPU Stop and Start Attack; 4) Memory Read
and Write Logic Attack; 5) Decrypting
Siemens Simatic firmware; 6) Getting a Shell
on the PLC. The exploits demonstrated by
Beresford were using PROFINET and
communicating across TCP/IP port 102 (ISO-
TSAP).
PROFINET is a standard for Industrial
Ethernet based on Industrial Ethernet and
support the following three protocols [9]:
1. TCP/IP with reaction times in the
range of 100 ms
2. RT (real-time) protocol with 10 ms
cycle times
3. IRT (Isochronous Real-Time) with
cycles times of less than 1 ms
Data is transmitted in plain text over
TCP/IP port 102 (ISO-TSAP). Therefore, if
attackers record the network traffic, they could
easily extract data such as user names,
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passwords, commands, negotiated sessions,
logic, etc. Any of these variables could lead a
PLC to be compromised.
DIGITAL FORENSICS
CHALLENGES ON
SCADA SYSTEMS
Cyber forensics can be challenging when being
applied to non-traditional environments like
SCADA systems. The systems are not
comprised of current information technologies
and not designed with technologies to provide
adequate data storage or audit capabilities. In
addition, further complexity is introduced if
the environment is designed using proprietary
solutions and protocols, thus limiting the ease
of which modern forensic methods can be
utilized [11].
Due to the complexity of SCADA systems,
evidence is difficult or impossible to be
extracted and collected by using traditional
digital forensics for investigation. One of the
challenges is that the operations of SCADA
systems must be kept running, therefore,
investigators cannot shut down the system to
perform data acquisition [2]. In such situation,
live forensics is the possible way to perform
data acquisition. However, performing live
forensics on SCADA systems might affect its
normal operations. The second challenge is
that many SCADA systems use proprietary
and legacy software, hardware and
communication protocols. Therefore,
traditional digital forensic tools might not be
able to apply to the systems. Furthermore,
SCADA forensics is lack of event logs for
investigation
Figure 1. LAD Diagram of a Control Program
LADDER LOGIC
PROGRAMMING
PLC is designed to be operated by engineers.
The engineers are good at electrical circuit
design but might have limited knowledge of
computer programming. Meanwhile, different
kinds of automation control systems need
different kinds of PLC control programs.
Therefore, Ladder Logic (LAD) is the most
common programming Language for PLC
because the programming language looks like a
simple wiring diagram for an electrical circuit
[1].
A LAD diagram in Figure 1 consists of a
set of ladder rungs and each rung has a set of
input instructions and output instructions [1].
The ladder diagram has two vertical rails. The
left vertical rail supplies power to all the
horizontal rungs of the ladder. Each rung on
the ladder defines one operation in the control
process.
A LAD diagram is read from top to bottom
and left to right. Each rung must start with an
input or inputs and must end with at least one
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output. The input is used for a control action,
such as closing the contact of a switch. The
output is used for a device connected to the
output of a PLC such as a motor or a valve. In
Figure 1, Rung No. 1 can be interpreted as if
Input I0.0 (Switch) is ON, then the Output
Q0.0 (Motor) is ON. Likewise if I0.0 is OFF,
then Q0.0 is OFF. Rung No. 2 is that if either
Input I0.1 or I0.2 is ON, then the Output Q0.1
is ON, otherwise Q0.1 is OFF. Rung No. 3 is
that if Input I0.3 is ON, the Output Q0.2 will
be ON after 3 seconds delay. The time delay is
controlled by the Timer1 (TON: Timer on
Delay).
PROPOSED SOLUTION
FOR PLC FORENSICS
BASED ON CONTROL
PROGRAM LOGIC
CHANGE DETECTION
In this paper, we propose a solution to detect
two most common attacks on PLC. The first
attack is Control Program Attack which
reprograms the PLCs, like STUXNET. The
second attack is Memory Read and Write
Logic Attack which alters values of memory
variable of a control program on a running
PLC.
To detect these attacks, we use a program
called Control Program Logic Change Detector
(CPLCD) with a set of Detection Rules (DRs).
CPLCD is a program developed by using
Libnodave. Libnodave is a free library for data
exchange between a PC and a Siemens PLC
over TCP/IP port 102 (ISO-TSAP) [4].
CPLCD is working on Microsoft Windows
environment. It has to work with a set of
defined Detection Rules (DRs) for detecting
these two PLC attacks. DR is in the form of
Boolean expression derived from the LAD
control program. Different designs of control
programs are converted to different sets of
DRs.
To define a DR, we have to transform each
rung of a Ladder Logic (LAD) diagram into a
Boolean Expression according to the way of
connection among Inputs, Outputs, memory
variables, etc. For example, if Input A
connects Input B in series with Output C, then
we can formulate a DR as A AND B = C. If
Input A connects Input B in parallel, then we
can formulate a DR as A OR B = C. The
three DRs shown in Table 1 are derived from
the three rungs of LAD diagram in Figure 1.
If the PLC operations do not follow the
instructions of the control program, we assume
the PLC might suffer from attacks or PLC
failure. Followings are the procedures for
detecting the two PLC attacks using CPLCD
and DRs. Assume the PLC control program is
same as Figure 1.
Table 1
Detection Rules
Rung No. Detection Rule
1 I0.0 = Q0.0
2 I0.1 OR I0.2 = Q0.1
3 (I0.3 AND Timer1=3) = Q0.2
1. Transform each ladder rung of the
LAD Diagram into DRs (see Table
1).
2. Connect CPLCD to PLC via
TCP/IP port 102.
3. Run CPLCD to read the memory
variables (e.g. I0.0, M0.0, Q0.0, etc.)
of control program from the PLC
and assign values
(TRUE/FALSE/Numbers) of the
variables to the DRs. When any one
of the values violates the DRs,
CPLCD raises alert and logs the
event and timestamp in a file for
forensic investigation.
CPLCD is able to perform real-time PLC
attack detection on a running PLC and
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capture the attack details in a log file for
forensic investigation.
In order to prove the feasibility of our
solution, we set up two experiments for
detecting the two attacks. Experiment 1 is for
detecting the Control Program Attack and
Experiment 2 is for detecting Memory Read
and Write Logic Attack. As Siemens is one of
the popular PLC manufacturers, we select
Siemens Simatic S7-1200 for our experiments.
Experiment 1: Setup and
procedures for detecting Control
Program Attack
To set up this experiment, we used one PLC,
one PC and a router. They were connected as
diagram shown in Figure 2. The PC was
installed with CPLCD for detecting the attack.
The procedures for detecting the attack
were as follows:
Step 1: Designed two control programs.
One was the original program in Figure 4 and
the other one was altered by an attacker in
Figure 5 to create abnormal instructions. The
attacker altered the second rung of the original
control program from (I0.1 AND M0.1) = Q0.1
to (I0.1 OR M0.1) = Q0.1
Step 2: Defined two Detection Rules (DRs)
based on the original control program as
follows:
DR No. 1: (I0.0 OR M0.0) = Q0.0
DR No. 2: (I0.1 AND M0.1) = Q0.1
Step 3: Loaded the altered control program
with initial memory values, M0.1=False and
Input I0.1=True into the Siemens Simatic S7-
1200 PLC by Siemens programming software
STEP 7 and started running the PLC.
Step 4: Started the CPLCD program with
the defined DRs to monitor memory variables
of the control program in the PLC and check
any DR was violated by the values of the
variables.
Step 5: An alert was raised, checked error
log file of CPLCD as shown in Figure 3.
Experiment 1: Result
According to the error log captured by CPLCD
in Figure 3, an alert was raised and logged on
27/6/2015, 11:02:43 PM because the values of
I0.1, M0.1 and Q0.1 violated DR No. 2. Under
normal operation of DR No. 2, Q0.1=True
only if both I0.1 and M0.1=True at the same
time, otherwise, Q0.1=False. However,
CPLCD detected that I0.1=True, M0.1=False
and Q0.1=False which violated DR No. 2.
Experiment 2: Setup and
procedures for detecting
Memory Read and Write Logic
Attack
This experiment setup was same as
Experiment 1 but one more PC was added as
shown in Figure 7. The PC installed with
Snap7 acting as an Attacker to perform
Memory Read and Write Logic Attack. We
used Snap7 to alter the PLC’s memory data.
Snap7 is not a PLC attacking tool, it is an
open source, 32/64 bit, multi-platform
Ethernet communication suite for interfacing
natively with Siemens S7 PLCs [7].
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The procedures for detecting the attack
were as follows:
Step 1: Designed a control program (Figure
6) and load the control program into the PLC.
Set initial value of Input I0.0, I0.1, I0.2, I0.3
and I0.4 to False so that Output Q0.0 and
Q0.1 were False, and then started running the
PLC.
Figure 6. Control Program
Step 2: Defined two Detection Rules (DRs)
according to the control program as follows:
DR No. 1: (I0.0 OR I0.1) = Q0.0
DR No. 2: (I0.2 AND I0.3 AND I0.4) =
Q0.1
Step 3: Started the CPLCD program with
the defined DRs to monitor memory variables
of the PLC control program and check any DR
was violated by the values of the variables.
Step 4: Used Snap7 to alter the PLC’s
memory Output Q0.0 and Q0.1 to True from
False.
Step 5: An alert was raised, checked error
log file of CPLCD as shown in Figure 8.
Figure 2.Setup of Experiment 1
Figure 4. Original Control Program Figure 5. Altered Control Program
Figure 3. Result of Experiment 1
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Experiment 2: Result
According to the error log captured by CPLCD
in Figure 8, DR No. 1 and DR No. 2 were
violated on 28/6/2015 9:07:40 AM because of
the action in Step 4. DR No. 1 was violated by
the value Q0.0=True and DR No. 2 was
violated by the value Q0.1=True.
DISCUSSION
Based on the defined Detection Rules (DRs),
Control Program Logic Change Detector
(CPLCD) was able to detect the Control
Program Attack and Memory Read and Write
Logic Attack. However, it is difficult or
impossible to define the entire DRs from a
complicated LAD diagram which has a lot of
rungs and to monitor all the memory variables.
To address this issue, we propose to select
important rungs for monitoring instead of all
the rungs. Different control systems have
different important rules. In general, a rung
used to stop control system under dangerous
condition should be important.
CPLCD can detect Memory Read and
Write Logic Attack, however, it cannot
provide sufficient information for forensic
investigation. CPLCD does not capture
information about how and who changes the
PLC memory which induced the abnormal
PLC operations. In order to supplement more
information for forensic investigation, we
recommend CPLCD to work with network
packet analyzer Wireshark. Wireshark
supports PROFINET to record and analyze
the Ethernet message frames. It can be used to
dissect the ISO on TCP-packets for
communication to Siemens S7 PLCs after
adding Wireshark dissector plugin for S7
communication.
S7 Protocol is Function oriented or
Command oriented, i.e. each transmission
contains a command or a reply. It is the
backbone of the Siemens communications, its
Ethernet implementation relies on ISO-on-TCP
(RFC1006) which is Block oriented by design
[8]. Each block is named S7 PDU (Protocol
Data Unit). Each command (S7 Telegram)
consists of a header, a set of parameters
(Params), a parameters data (Pardata) and a
data block (Data) as shown in Figure 8. The
Figure 7. Setup of Experiment 2 Figure 8. Result of Experiment 2
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first two elements are always present, the other
two are optional. If a S7 Telegram consists of
Header="Write", Params="DB, 10",
Pardata="4" and Data="data", it can be
interpreted as "Write 'data' into Data Block
10 starting from the offset 4" [8]. S7 Protocol,
ISO TCP and TCP/IP follow the well-known
encapsulation rule, shown in Figure 8 [8].
According to the S7 Protocols specifications
and the well-known encapsulation rule, forensic
investigator is able to construct useful
information from the TCP/IP data packets for
investigation.
Following is a case to illustrate how
CPLCD and Wireshark work together for
forensic investigation on cyber-attack to a
PLC. A PLC controls a motor (Q0.0) by two
switches (I0.0 and I0.1). The motor is ON only
when the two switches are ON, otherwise it is
OFF. Therefore, the DR is “I0.0 AND I0.1 =
Q0.0”. Assuming an attacker tries to turn on
the motor by altering Output Q0.0 from
FALSE to TRUE when both input switches
are OFF (FALSE).
Before Attack:
The switches are OFF and the Motor is
OFF.
The DR is “FALSE AND FALSE =
FALSE”.
After Attack:
The switches are OFF but the Motor is
ON.
The DR “FALSE AND FALSE = TRUE”
is violated.
Since the DR is violated after the attack,
CPLCD raises an alert and logs the variable
names/values and timestamp on a file. A
forensic investigator can use the timestamp to
filter out the relevant packets from the file
captured by Wireshark. Based on the analysis
of those network packets, the investigator can
trace what and how the S7 commands were
executed to attack the PLC. Besides, we might
be able to reveal the IP address of the attacker
in this way.
CONCLUSION AND
FUTURE WORK
PLC is one of the important components in
SCADA systems but lack of security control
and hard to perform digital forensics on it. It is
facing many cyber-attacks after exposing
SCADA systems to Internet dramatically in
recent years. Siemens is aware of the security
issues and provides warning on Simatic S7-
1200 Manual "If an attacker can physically
access your networks, the attacker can possibly
read and write data" [12].
Digital Forensics is an essential part of
cyber defense and becomes relevant when there
is a security breach [10]. However, there are
insufficient forensic tools and procedures to
perform digital forensics on PLC. To help
Figure 8. S7 Protocols
Source: Snap7 Reference manual [8]
Figure 3 S7 Protocols
Source: Snap7 Reference manual [8]
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overcome challenges on PLC protection and
forensic investigation, in this paper, we
introduced how Control Program Logic
Change Detector (CPLCD) and Detection
Rules (DRs) can be used to detect Control
Program Attack and Memory Read and Write
Logic Attack. In addition, we illustrated how
CPLCD work with Wireshark dissector for S7
communication to perform forensic
investigation on S7 PLCs.
In future, we will apply CPLCD to various
types and brands of PLCs for testing of
performance, accuracy and feasibility.
Furthermore, we will expand our testing to a
simulated control system application such as
elevator, traffic light, robotic arm, etc.
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